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The Clergyman: His Privileges and Liabilities
Valentine A. Toth*
T HE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION of church and state does not ex-
clude the civil courts from jurisdiction over many church-
related questions. Constitutional guarantees of freedom of reli-
gion may not be allowed to lead to anarchy by allowing the
church to be independent of state surveillance. On the other
hand, the law does not claim that the church purchased its inde-
pendence at the price of not criticizing the state when morality,
ethical government or responsible citizenship are at stake.
While this discussion is couched chiefly in terms of Prot-
estant churches and clergymen, it is equally applicable to Roman
Catholic, Jewish, and other religious polities as well, in most
respects.
I. Generally
In order to limit the surveillance of the state to the proper
fields, and to assure freedom of religion, the law confers privileges
upon the churches and the clergy and imposes liabilities upon
them also.'
The courts, for these purposes, categorize the matters in
which the law has any concern or contact with churches. Gener-
ally the law professes little concern for the doctrines of churches,
but it is frequently concerned with their government and with
the polities of the denominations.2 The courts ordinarily accept
jurisdiction when questions of property or civil rights are in-
volved.3 In line with this categorization, in the eyes of the law
church organizations possess dual natures.4 Public policy as-
sumes that an unincorporated religious association, or a religious
society incorporated under the statutes, and a church associated
therewith for the observance of sacraments, although indis-
* Pastor of the United Church of Christ (Evangelical and Reformed) in
Lorain, Ohio; Vice-President of the Lorain Ministerial Association; gradu-
ate of the University of Kolozsvar (Roumania); Post-Graduate work at the
Kaiser Wilhelm University (Berlin); and the Central European Institute(Vienna); Second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Stringfellow, Law, Polity and Reunion, 20 Ohio St. L. J. 112 (1959); 14 C.
J. S. 1117; Contra: Wyandotte County v. Wyandotte Presb. Church, 30
Kans. 620, 1 P. 109, 112 (1883).
2 Fiske v. Beatty, 201 N. Y. S. 441 (1923), 238 N. Y. 598, 144 N. E. 907
(1924).
3 Casey v. R. Cath. Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 143 A. 2d 628
(1958).
4 Harlem Church v. N. Y. Greater Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 260
N. Y. S. 517, 521, 198 N. E. 615 (1932); Bennet v. LaGrange, 153 Ga. 428,
112 S. E. 482, 486 (1922).
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solubly associated, are separated by a distinct line of demarca-
tion. The corporation is the legal entity which holds the title to
the real and personal property. The "church" is the body of
communicants gathered in the church membership for the ob-
servance of sacraments and for mutual support and edification
of piety, morality and religious observances.5 Although each of
these two bodies, viz: the corporation and the church, may exist
within the pale of the other, they are in no respect correlatives."
The objects and interests of one are moral and spiritual; the other
deals with things temporal and material.7
A religious corporation created by statutes must be regarded
as a legal personality, and is in no sense eccelesiastical in its
functions. The temporalities of this corporation must be admin-
istered, however, within denominational usage, with the contem-
plation of coexistence of a church in the spiritual sense and a
church in the legal sense, working together towards the same
beneficial ends.8
The courts draw two broad, general conclusions from this
dual aspect of churches: (1) Civil courts, when dealing with
property and civil rights, attempt to act in harmony with the con-
stitution, confessions of faith and usages of the denominations.9
(2) Civil courts afford no remedies for abuses of ecclesiastical
authority which do not violate civil or property rights, and con-
troversies over theological questions are within the jurisdiction
of ecclesiastical tribunals. 10 The only exception to the second
point seems to be the case where ecclesiastical tribunals act in
excess of their jurisdictions or powers or in clear violation of the
fundamental laws of the church. 1
5 Master v. Second Parish of Portland, 36 F. Supp. 918, 925 (D. C., D. Me.,
S. D., 1940); 124 F. 2d 622.
6 45 Am. Jur. 727.
7 Petty v. Tooker, 21 N. Y. 267, 271, 8 N. Y. S. 270, 271 (1860); Walker
Memorial Baptist Church v. Saunders, 173 (N. Y.) Misc. 455, 457, 17 N. Y. S.
2d 842, 844 (1940); 285 N. Y. 462, 35 N. E. 2d 42 (1941); 45 Am. Jur. 723;
Christian Church v. Summer, 149 Ala. 145, 43 S. 8 (1907); Hardin v.
Second Baptist Church, 51 Mich. 137, 16 N. W. 311 (1883); 70 A. L. R. 88;
76 C. J. S. 735; Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations (1956);
Stringfellow, op. cit. supra n. 1; Lilly v. Tobein, 103 Mo. 477, 15 S. W. 618
(1891).
8 Fiske v. Beatty, supra n. 2; Westminster Presbyterian Church v. Trustees
of Presbytery of N. Y., 105 N. Y. 199, 202, 96 N. E. 1134 (1914).
9 Sanders v. Edwards, 199 Ga. 266, 34 S. E. 2d 167, 168 (1945).
10 Shaw v. Harvey, 103 Ind. App. 280, 7 N. E. 2d 515 (1937).
11 Stone v. Bogue, 238 Mo. App. 392, 181 S. W. 2d 187 (1944); Mason v.
Lee, 96 Miss. 186, 50 S. 625 (1909); Hatfield v. DeLong, 156 Ind. 207, 59
N. E. 483 (1901); Kompier v. Thegza, 213 Ind. 542, 13 N. E. 2d 229, 231
(1938); Russian-Serbian Holy Trinity Orth. Church v. Kulik, 202 Minn.
560, 279 N. W. 364, 369 (1938); Gibson v. Trustees of Pencader Presb.
Church, 25 Del. Ch. 317, 20 A. 2d 134, 138 (1941); Fiske v. Beatty, supra n.
2.
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THE CLERGYMAN
The distinction between the religious corporation and the
spiritual church enables the courts to clarify the legal status of
the clergyman.12
II. The Minister and the Religious Corporation
The religious corporation possesses no powers other than
strictly temporal ones, and is managed according to denomina-
tional policy. Control of its temporal affairs (in other words, the
management of the corporation) is in the hands of the trustees. 13
If the polity of the denomination does not expressly provide
otherwise, the minister, by the mere fact of his appointment, em-
ployment or election, does not become a trustee or an officer of
the corporation. In Fiske v. Beatty the court says:
He is not a corporate officer nor does he administer to the
corporate needs of a group of incorporators. He is the ad-
visor, guide and shepherd of a spiritual flock, not the man-
ager of corporate properties.' 4
His relation to the corporation is determined by the polity of
the denominations. Generally three church polities (in Christian
churches) are recognized by the law:
(1) Episcopal: The bishop is the primary governor of the
church and guardian of faith and discipline, but has no absolute
authority or unrestricted discretion. In the Roman Catholic
church the bishop holds title to the property of the church and
is often called a corporation sole.15
(2) Presbyterian: In the denominations adhering to this
polity the congregations are governed by elders. Neighboring
congregations form a church district (Synod or Presbitery). The
district is governed by elected lay-members and ministers.
(3) Congregational: In this system each congregation exer-
cises authority in matters of doctrine and discipline. 16 In some
states religious corporate statutes clarify the relationship of the
minister and the religious corporation in harmony with these
polities.'7
12 Harlem Church v. Greater N. Y. Corp., supra n. 4; Master v. Second
Parish of Portland, supra n. 5.
13 Russian-Serbian Holy Trinity Orth. Church v. Kulik, supra n. 11; 76
C. J. S. 776; 45 Am. Jur. 738.
14 Fiske v. Beatty, at p. 447, supra n. 2.
15 Casey v. R. Cath. Archbishop of Baltimore, supra n. 3.
16 Elston v. Wilborn, 208 Ark. 377, 186 S. W. 2d 662, 663 (1945); Steward
v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S. E. 2d 368, 369 (1950).
17 N. Y. Relig. Corp. L. (Consol. L. Ch. 52, § 2. 1951); N. J. Stat. Ann. t.
16 (1939); 76 C. J. S. § 40, 796.
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Other states arrive at the same result by less detailed stat-
utes or by court decisions.1 s Some denominational polities pro-
vide that the minister shall be a trustee or the president of the
board of trustees.19 Other denominations do not have such pro-
visions for the local churches. Even if provisions should be
made which confer upon the minister an office in the corpora-
tion, this office is incidental to his ministerial capacity.
20
Church polities and applicable law in other than Christian
churches are too specialized to be treated here. But it should be
understood that there are equivalent legal provisions for the
other religious faiths such as Judaism, the Moslem church, and
so forth.
The minister is not ex officio an agent of the religious corpo-
ration and has no implied authority to bind it.2 1 In the absence
of special authorization he cannot bind the bishop in temporal
matters.2 2 The service rendered by a minister is for religious and
not for mercenary ends, but the religious corporation is respon-
sible to take care of his temporal needs, and the contract in-
volved gives pecuniary rights which the law enforces.
23
HI. The Office of the Minister and Election of Pastors
The ministry of the church is the ecclesiastical function of
the church.24 Since the law generally is not concerned with the
ecclesiastical functions of the church, the training, education,
licensing and ordination of a minister are purely ecclesiastical
matters. A person is accepted as a minister, by the law, if he is
duly licensed or ordained by a church. While members of other
learned professions are usually not recognized, licensed or ac-
cepted by law as professionals without certain educational or legal
requirements, the members of the clergy do not have to meet any
such standards besides the requirements of the licensing or
ordaining denomination. In Ohio and in most of the states the
courts license ministers to solemnize marriages if they are "duly
ordained" by a church and if they serve a denomination or a con-
gregation in that capacity.25
Is Rev. Stat. Neb. § 21,801 (1954); Ohio Rev. Code, § 3101.08 (1958).
19 N. Y. Relig. Corp. L., supra n. 17; Fiske v. Beatty, supra n. 2.
20 N. Y. Relig. Corp. L., supra n. 17.
21 C. J. S. § 44, 801; Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N. J. 22, 141
A. 2d 273 (1958).
22 C. J. S. §44, 801.
23 (As with any contract.)
24 Rector of St. George Church v. Morgan, 152 N. Y. S. 497, 88 Misc. 702
(1915).
25 Ohio Rev. Code, supra n. 18; 38 C. J. 1311, n. 93-95.
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The New York Religious Corporation Law gives a good illus-
tration of this exclusive power of the church body:
The term "clergy" and the term minister include a duly au-
thorized pastor, rector, priest, rabbi, and a person having
authority from or in accordance with, the rules and regula-
tions of the governing ecclesiastical body of the denomination
or order, if any, to which the church belongs, or otherwise
from the church or synagogue to preside over and direct the
spiritual affairs of the church or synagogue. 2
A definition given by a Federal Court says, in essence, that
a duly "ordained minister" is generally one who followed a pre-
scribed course of study of religious principles, has been conse-
crated to the service of living and teaching that religion through
an ordination ceremony under the auspices of an established
church, has been commissioned by that church as its minister in
the service of God, and generally is subject to control or dis-
cipline by a council of the church. 27 Other state statutes and
court rulings are essentially in accord with these definitions and
are in agreement that the church has the sole right to confer
upon a person the attributes of a minister. In consequence, when
the courts are to decide whether a person is a minister or not,
they look into the rules, practices and standards of the ordaining
church body. It was held to be proper for federal authorities to
seek the advice of a religious board before deciding whether a
person was a member of the clergy or not.28 The polity of cer-
tain denominations draws a clear line between the clergy and
laity (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Episcopal), but the
distinction becomes more difficult when the principle of the uni-
versal priesthood prevails, even to the extent that some Protes-
tant church bodies commission lay ministers.29 The line of dis-
tinction is almost non-existent where the church maintains that
every church member is a minister.30
A duly recognized, licensed or ordained minister becomes the
pastor of a congregation if a pastoral relation is created. Accord-
ing to ecclesiastical laws this pastoral relation is created by the
appointment, election or employment of the minister.3 1 The
26 N. Y. Relig. Corp. L. supra n. 17.
27 Buttecali v. United States, 130 F. 2d 172, 174 (5th Cir., 1942).
28 Eagles v. United States, 329 U. S. 304 (1946).
29 The Constitution and By-laws of the E. and R. Church, Part IV., 20
(1956).
30 Gonzales v. United States, 348 U. S. 407 (1955).
31 The Constitution and By-Laws of the E. and R. Church, Part III., 17,
18 (1956); Franklin v. Hahn, 275 S. W. 2d 776 (Ky. App., 1955); Kelly v.
McIntire, 123 N. J. Eq. 351, 197 A. 736, 740 (1938); Walker Memorial Baptist
Church v. Saunders, supra n. 7; N. Y. Relig. Corp. L. supra n. 17; N. J.
Stat. Ann., supra n. 17.
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pastoral relation is for religious purposes, and the minister be-
comes the spiritual leader of the congregation, being expected to
serve the spiritual church in accordance with the beliefs, rules
and regulations of the higher denomination or of the congrega-
tion. The trustees of the religious corporation generally have no
control over the calling, settlement, dismissal or removal of the
minister. 32 If a minister is suspended by denominational authori-
ties, members are entitled to enjoin him from conducting serv-
ices.3 3 In the absence of fraud, collusion or arbitrariness, the sus-
pension of a church pastor by the highest judicatory of the de-
nomination is conclusive enough to prevent him from continuing
to occupy the pulpit of the church. If a minister is suspended by
denominational authorities, members are entitled to enjoin him
from conducting services.3 4 In the famous Melish case, the ma-
jority of the members of the Church of the Holy Trinity (Brook-
lyn, N. Y.) retained as their pastors Dr. John H. Melish and his
son the Rev. William H. Melish, against the orders of Bishop
James De Wolfe. The controversy between the pastors and the
higher ecclesiastical authority arose from alleged pro-communist
statements of the pastors. Since freedom of speech, and not prop-
erty rights, was the main issue of the controversy, the courts did
not enforce the bishop's orders, and the United States Supreme
Court refused to review the case.35 Even if property rights are
involved, courts refuse to take jurisdiction if the minister's
change of beliefs was "no clear case of departure" from the
standards of the congregation, especially when the minister was
backed by the majority of the congregation.30 In congregational
type churches, courts recognize the decisions of the majority of
the congregation, or the ecclesiastical authority of duly organized
committees, when they deal with problems of pastoral relation,
where no injury to property or personal rights occurred.3 7
When personal or civil wrong is committed by the religious
corporation against a minister, the civil courts may interfere even
if ecclesiastical authority is concerned. In Whitecar v. Michener
the court held that a man's profession is his property and that
the bishop cannot prohibit a priest from following his profession
without accusation and opportunity for hearing and trial.38 In
32 Fiske v. Beatty, supra n. 2; Mathis v. Holmes, 134 N. J. Eq. 186, 34 A. 2d
645, 647 (1943); Freeman, Exemptions from Civil Responsibilities, 20 Ohio
St. L. J. 437 (1959).
33 Kelly v. McIntire, supra n. 31 at p. 741.
34 Ibid.
35 Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom (1953).
36 Gilkey, State Intervention in Matters of Religion, 27 Kan. L. R. 41
(1958).
37 Ibid.
38 Whitecar v. Michenor, 37 N. J. Eq. 6 (1883).
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O'Moore v. Driscoll, the plaintiff, a priest, was forced to sign a
confession implicating him in crime, forcing him to retire to an
institution for the insane and infirm maintained under church
jurisdiction. The court answered the question whether these acts
were so essentially matters of ecclesiastical discipline as to be
irremediable in a court of civil jurisdiction, by ruling that such
acts of church superiors might give rise to a cause of action.39
IV. Professional Privileges of the Clergy
In certain circumstances the law protects tradesmen and
members of learned professions. This protection grants them
some conditional or qualified privileges.40 The privilege is gener-
ally attached to their trades or professions, and the test of its ex-
istence is whether a person was touched by his profession or by
his office. 41 While this test is applied rather narrowly when mem-
bers of other learned professions are concerned, the law offers
the clergy a broader protection. In Chaddock v. Briggs the
Massachusetts high court declares that a clergyman
Is separated from the world by his public ordination, and
carries with him constantly, whether in or out of the pulpit,
superior obligations to exhibit in his whole deportment the
purity of that religion which he professes to teach.4 2
The Ohio high court, in Hayner v. Truman, declares that min-
isters ought not to be regarded in the eyes of the law as purer
or holier than any other men, and are not entitled to protection
in any greater degree than others.4 3 Words spoken of him, how-
ever, concerning him in his ministerial duties, his profession, or
calling, are actionable per se. The reasoning of the court said:
Because they tend to deprive him of the emoluments which
pertain to his profession, and may prevent his obtaining em-
ployment .... not because his office is higher than that of
his fellowman. 44
1. Defamation of Clergymen
Before the Reformation, in the English common law the
privilege of the clergy was almost absolute, and even later Coke
pronounced from the bench that "to disturb a preacher is to dis-
turb God." 45 Later the privilege of the clergy was narrowly
construed in England, and in the 17th Century there was a hint
39 0. Moore v. Driscoll, 135 Cal. App. 770, 28 P. 2d 438 (1933).
40 2 Cooley on Torts, § 237, p. 221 (4th ed., 1932); Ecuyer v. N. Y. Life,
101 Wash. 247, 172 P. 359, 363 (1918).
41 Morache v. Broche, 151 Mass. 567, 25 N. E. 74 (1890).
42 Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 248 (1816).
43 Hayner v. Truman, 27 Ohio St. 292 (1875).
44 Ibid., at p. 295.
45 Greswick v. Rooksby, 2 Bulst. 47, 53.
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that its privileges were non-existent.46 In the 18th and early in
the 19th Century it was clearly denied that such privilege ever
existed.4 7 In the United States the "touching of the profession"
test was used by courts in deciding whether or not a clergyman
could be defamed with impunity. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled
that a charge of drunkenness is not per se actionable. It could
be made actionable per se, in the case of a clergyman, only if it
were spoken in reference to the performance of his ministerial
duties. 48 A libelous message sent to a minister, saying: "you are
a liar," and published later by a newspaper, was libelous per
se.49 It is actionable without proof of damage to say of a clergy-
man that he is the subject of scandalous rumors.50 When an
editorial called a minister unmannerly, discourteous and ignorant,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held the statement to be
libelous per se. The court found that the editorial exposed the
clergyman to contempt, hatred, scorn or ridicule, and that the
article was calculated to injure him in his office, profession or
trade.51 Though ordinarily a charge of immorality not amount-
ing to an indictable crime is not actionable per se, there is an
exception in the case of a clergyman. Ministers of the gospel
being teachers and exemplars of moral and Christian duty, pure
and unspotted moral character is absolutely necessary to their
usefulness. Their whole lives, and not merely the hours engaged
in the pulpit, are watched and closely scrutinized.52 Even if some
words touching a clergyman are actionable per se, which would
not be so if spoken of others, it does not follow that all words
which tend to bring a clergyman into disrepute, or which merely
impute that he had done something wrong, are actionable with-
out proof of special damage. The imputation, therefore, must be
such that, if true, it would tend to prove him unfit to continue his
calling, therefore leading more or less directly to proceedings by
the proper authorities to silence him.53 If a clergyman is as-
saulted in the pulpit, this is but an assault, though the time and
the place may aggravate the wrong. 54 Certain statements have
different meaning at different times. Since 1949, under Reming-
ton v. Bentley, the statement that a clergyman is a communist
would be actionable.5
5
46 Anon. (1694) Skin. 404.
47 Peake, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, 128 (1801).
48 Lawson, The Slander of a Person in His Calling, 15 Am. L. R. 573 (1881).
49 Munson v. Latrop, 96 Wisc. 386, 71 N. W. 596 (1897).
50 Cobbs v. Chicago Defender, 308 Ill. App. 55, 31 N. W. 2d 323 (1941).
51 Pentuff v. Park, 194 N. C. 146, 138 S. E. 616 (1927).
52 3 Lawson, Rights, Remedies and Practice § 1255.
53 4 Newell, Slander and Libel, § 144, p. 176.
54 2 Cooley on Torts, 221-222 (4th ed. 1932).
55 Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S. D., N. Y. 1949).
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2. The Privilege of Nondisclosure
The privilege of nondisclosure was not extended to ministers
by the common law in England. The English law, as recited by
Regina v. Hay, declares that the clergyman has no privilege to
refuse confessional information.56 American courts, especially
since 1846, manifested reluctance to enforce the common law
rule.6T In 1923 the Minnesota legislature, among other state
legislatures, changed the common law rule. 58 A clergyman, today,
shall not without the consent of the party making the con-
fession, be allowed to disclose a confession made to him
in his professional character in the course of discipline en-
joined by the rules or practice of the religious body to which
he belongs.5 9
The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that this privilege is not
extended to Roman Catholic priests alone, but to all who may
stand as spiritual representatives of their churches.6 0
To be privileged, the communication must be made to the
clergyman as such, and by a person seeking religious or spiritual
advice, aid or comfort. The fundamental thought is that one
may safely consult his spiritual adviser.61 The Michigan Supreme
Court declares that, by statutes and for reason of public policy,
the clergyman and doctor should have the same privilege as the
lawyer in common law.6 2 Earlier Michigan decisions apply the
same rule, saying that statements made to a minister in his minis-
terial office are privileged. 63 The reason of his privilege is stated
by the Iowa Supreme Court, thus:
... the human being does sometimes have need of a place
of penitence and confession and spiritual discipline. When
any person enters that sacred chamber, this statute closes
the door upon him, and civic authority turns aways its ear. 64
A bishop's charge to his clergy is privileged. 65
3. Exemptions of the Clergy
The state has recognized, without expressly so stating, that
many of its functions are at best non-religious and at worst
downright sinful in the eyes of high religion. Unwilling to re-
56 Regina v. Hay, 2 F. & F. 4, 175 Engl. Rep. 933 (N. P. 1860).
57 In Re Swanson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N. W. 589, 590 (1931); Prosser, Law
of Torts, 534 (2d ed., 1955); E. Barron Estate Co. v. Woodroff, 163 Cal. 561,
126 P. 351 (1912).
58 Minn. Gen. Stat. § 98 subd. 3 (1923).
59 Ibid.
60 In re Swanson, supra n. 57, p. 590.
01 Ibid.; Cooley, op. cit. supra n. 54, vol. 1, p. 554.
62 In re Swanson supra n. 57, p. 591.
63 Vickers v. Stoneman, 73 Mich. 419, 41 N. W. 495, 496 (1889).
64 Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N. W. 290, 293 (1917).
65 Laughton v. Bishop of Sodor, L. R. 4 Priv. Council, 495 S. C. 4 Moak 162.
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lease the average religious citizen from his temporal obligations
merely because of this tacit admission, the state seemed to con-
cede to the clergy a special position in certain cases.
Exemptions from jury duty. The states exempt the clergy
from the duty to serve as jurors. The reason for this exemption
seems to be two-fold: (1) The minister is a confidant, with the
privilege against testifying, especially when he is given the
privilege of non-disclosure. (2) The minister cannot be forced
to judge people.66 The state statutes granting ministers this
exemption, however, usually do not explain this rule.
67
Exemption from oath. Members of the clergy are exempted
from taking an oath, and in some states the oath can be refused
on religious grounds by other witnesses also. In Moore v. United
States the Supreme Court ruled that the word "solemnly" was
not required if affirmation was made by a witness.68 In 1870
Illinois, among other states, provided in its constitution that
either oath or affirmation would suffice.
Exemption from military service. Members of the clergy are
exempt from military service.69 This exemption is granted upon
sufficient evidence that the exempt person is a member of the
clergy. The United States Supreme Court ruled that draft
boards could employ a theological panel to advise the board
whether a person is a member of the clergy.70 In another leading
case the lower courts looked into the religious education of a
conscientious objector before it was held that he was a minister.
The case was certified to the United States Supreme Court,
which gave recognition to exemptions claimed on religious
grounds.71
Liabilities of Churches and Ministers
It has been said that no charitable immunity exists anywhere
but in the United States. 72 The immunity rule was taken over
from England and was announced in 1876 and 1885.7 3 American
courts followed the English decision, not recognizing that the
English rule was reversed even prior to the earliest American
decisions. Through various decisions, four theories were de-
veloped- (1) trust fund, (2) waiver theory of beneficiaries,
(3) exemption from respondeat superior, (4) public policy
theory-by the courts in order to grant immunities to various
66 Freeman, op. cit. supra n. 32, p. 453.
67 Ohio Rev. Stat. § 2313.34.
68 Moore v. United States, 348 U. S. 966 (1955).
69 62 Stat. 611, 50 U. S. C. § 456(g) (1948).
70 Eagles v. United States, supra n. 28, at p. 316.
' Gonzales v. United States, supra n. 30.
72 25 A. L. R. 2d 29, 43.
73 Feoffees of Heriot Hosp. v. Ross, 12 C&F 507.
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charitable organizations but especially to churches. 74 The im-
munity rule became repulsive to an ever-increasing number
of jurisdictions, and it was cautiously handled by many courts
moving from immunity towards qualified immunities and dis-
tinguishing between ministerial and administrative activities of
charities and churches.75 Prior to 1942 only two or three juris-
dictions rejected the immunity of charities outright. 76 In that
year Judge Rutledge faced the problem squarely and ruled that
charities should respond as do individuals, business corporations
and others, when they do good in a wrong way. In his reason-
ing Rutledge demanded that liability insurance should be car-
ried by charities in order to protect the injured and to eliminate
"protected negligence." 77 In 1946 the United States, in the
Federal Tort Claims Act,78 waived its immunity from liability in
tort for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of federal
employees within the scope of their employment. The Rutledge
decision was followed by a flood of court decisions discarding or
criticizing charitable immunities. The courts, and authors of
law books and articles demanding the abolishment of these im-
munities, were strengthened by the Federal Tort Claims Act in
their general attack against negligent charities and churches.
Yet charitable immunity still survives in the majority of the
states. So far 18 states have rejected it, while the others are
divided, either maintaining the complete immunity rule or re-
stricting it to churches or to beneficiaries of charities. 79 Since
the doctrine of charitable immunities is mainly court-made law,
it is to be expected that it will be discarded by the courts of
even more "immunity states." This trend is clearly indicated
by dissenting opinions of judges in the immunity states:
The immunity of charitable institutions from liability for
negligence of their employees is court made law, based upon
erroneous, illogical and indefensible principles.80
74 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations, 110 (1956); Restate-
ment of Torts, Ch. 45, § 887; Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St.
467, 135 N. E. 2d 410 (1956); Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 440, 84 A. 2d
328, 331 (1951); Bruce v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 P. 798, 802 (1929).
75 Davis v. Central Congreg. Society, 129 Mass. 367 (1880); Bruce v. Central
Methodist Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N. W. 951 (1907); Downes v. Harper
Hosp., 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894); Bianchi v. South Park Presb.
Church, 123 N. J. L. 325, 8 A. 2d 567 (1939); Lyon v. Tumwater Evang.
Free Church, 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P. 2d 128 (1955); Roberts v. Ohio Valley
General Hosp., 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318 (1925).
76 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 57, p. 787.
77 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App. D. C.
123, 130 F. 2d 810 (App. D. C. 1942).
78 Fed. Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402,
2411, 2412, 2671-2680. (1952 Supp.)
79 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 57, p. 787; Note, 5 Cath. Univ. of Amer. L. R.
101 (1955).
80 Knecht v. St. Mary's Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 140 A. 2d 30, 40 (1958); Annual
Survey of American Law, 489 (1958); Landpaver v. Emmanuel Lutheran
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The immunity of charities is clearly in full retreat, and the end
of another decade probably will find the majority of the juris-
dictions holding that it does not exist.8 '
The church immunity doctrine protects religious corpora-
tions but does not affect the ecclesiastical functions of the church.
Therefore its retreat or abolition will not directly affect the
spiritual leaders of the church. Ministers, as spiritual leaders,
will still be protected in their ecclesiastical functions by other
rules of the law, and their liabilities as officers of their corpora-
tions are only incidental to their offices.8 2 Those jurisdictions
which have discarded church immunity are careful to stress that
judgments against churches for the negligence of clergymen are
rendered not against the spiritual church or its leaders but
against a negligent religious corporation or a negligent corporate
officer.
8 3
1. Freedom of Religious Opinions and Defamatory Publications
The right of freedom of speech touches the very heart of
religious liberty, and the American churches jealously guard
this freedom from any state interference. The General Assembly
of the Southern Presbyterian Church is in line with other major
denominations in declaring that a minister is called and set
apart, under God, to proclaim the whole counsel of God. The
assembly in this resolution reminds ministers that God alone is
the Lord of conscience, and that no session or congregation can
tell an ordained minister how he shall interpret the message of
salvation and its application to life.8 4 The constitutional guaran-
tees of freedom of speech enable the minister to take a stand
publicly in many controversial issues. He is assured by the
United States Supreme Court that any censorship of religious
opinion lies open to constitutional attack. 5 The right of free
speech, however, is not absolute, and there is a line at which
(Continued from preceding page)
Bld., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P. 2d 301 (1955); McDermott v. St. Mary Hosp. Corp.,
144 Conn. 417, 133 A. 2d 608 (1957); Annual Survey of American Law, 396
(1957).
81 Foster v. R. C. Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2 230 (1950); Wilson
v. Ev. Luth. Church of Reformation, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N. W. 708 (1930);
Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 231 P. 2d 241 (1951); Collopy v. Newark Eye
and Ear Infirmary, 27 N. J. 29, 141 A. 2d 276 (1958); Lokar v. Church of
the Sacred Heart, 24 N. J. 549, 555 133 A. 2d 12 (1957).
82 Dalton v. St. Luke's Cath. Church, 27 N. J. 22, 141 A. 2d 273 (1958);
Rector v. Morgan, supra n. 24; Casey v. R. Cath. Archbishop, supra n. 3.
83 Casey v. R. Cath. Archbishop, supra n. 3.
84 Minutes of the 98th Gen. Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in U. S.
pp. 76-78 (1958); Murray, The Role of the Churches (II), 34 Notre Dame
Law. 630, 639 (1959).
85 Kedroff v. St. Nicholaus Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 121 (1952); Konvitz,
Bill of Rights Reader, Leading Constitutional Cases (1954); Pfeffer, op. cit.
supra n. 35; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 679 (1872).
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permissible curtailment begins.86 This line of demarcation fluc-
tuates, and even the Supreme Court has abstained from attempt-
ing a precise definition. The nearest approach to a concrete test
appears in the precedent-making statement of Justice Holmes
that actionability depends on whether:
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent."'
The "clear and present danger" test may be applied to statements
which raise constitutional questions, but
there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any constitutional problems.
These include the lewd, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of peace. 8
The pulpit is not absolutely privileged and the clergy may be
made liable for creating a clear and present danger or for mak-
ing statements prohibited by the law. This liability of the clergy,
and its qualified privilege, are well defined, especially in the
second category. Defamatory communications, if prompted by a
duty to the public or a third person, or made in good faith and
without malice, touching a matter in which the party making
them has an interest to another having a corresponding interest,
are qualifiedly privileged.8 9 In other words, the law recognizes
qualified privilege in the clergy also, when the publication pro-
tects important interests of the publisher, is made to protect or
advance the interest of the recipient, is a communication between
those having a common interest for the protection or advance-
ment of that interest, or when publication is made to proper
persons in the interest of the public or is a "fair" comment of
public interest or concern.90 It was held that where the publisher
and recipient have a common interest, in some circumstances
there is a moral obligation to speak. This moral obligation of
churches and ministers is recognized by the law.91 The privilege
is forfeited if the clergyman steps outside of the scope of the
privilege or if the publication is prompted by ill will.92
86 Note, Freedom of Speech, etc., 24 St. John's L. R. 83, 85 (1949).
87 Schenck v. United States, 47 U. S. 52 (1919).
88 Chaplansky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942).
89 Ecuyer v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 40.
90 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 57, p. 606.
91 Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 N. H. 501, 144 A. 787 (1929); Creswell v. Pruitt,
239 S. W. 2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App., 1951); Pin v. Lawson, 63 App. D. C. 370,
72 F. 2d 742 (D. C. C. App., 1934).
92 Brewer v. Second Baptist Church of L. A., 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P. 2d 713
(1948).
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
9 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
If the minister is privileged to make publications, or if he is
protected by the constitution, the law protects him against third
parties also. (1) He is protected against state laws and statutes
which deprive clergymen and other citizens of the constitutional
right of free speech 3 (2) The constitution protects him against
the government, since the clergyman, as any individual citizen,
in discharging his public duties is privileged when he acts in his
public capacity. 94 (3) He is protected against his congregation,
as to privileged publications or when his constitutional rights to
free speech would be impaired by the congregation 5 This pro-
tection has gained momentum since the American clergy began
taking a firm stand to further desegregation, often against state
regulations and practices of local congregations.
The qualified privilege of the clergy does not exist when the
publication is defamatory per se. The words of a priest from a
pulpit were held to be actionable per se, where a medical doctor
was touched in his profession. In this case the court reasoned:
The defendant priest assumed to stand in a position of au-
thority. By virtue of this position he was able to exert a
special influence upon his people6
The rule in other similar cases is the same. No privilege was
given to a clergyman in making charges from the pulpit against
members of his congregation in relation to their business.97
2. Relational Torts and Liabilities
a. Reliance on opinion of experts. Pastoral counseling has
become one of the most important functions of clergymen.
Special courses are offered by seminaries to train future clergy-
men in this field. The church denominations strive to make ex-
perts of them in this field. This is evidenced by various scientifi-
cally developed methods and materials used by the denomina-
tions. The counseling of a pastor, who is presumed to be an
expert, with his parishioner, establishes a close and confidential
relation. The law of torts recognizes that special circumstances,
such as a confidential relation between the parties or disparity of
knowledge, justify the reliance of plaintiffs even if the representa-
tion purports to be only an opinion. There is a growing unwilling-
ness on the part of the courts to allow statements to be made
without liability, when the statements are calculated to induce
93 Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 139 N. E. 86, 90 (1923); 28 A. L. R.
1368; Terminello v. Chicago, 69 United States 894 (1949); Note: Limiting
State Action by the 14th Amendment, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1016 (1954).
94 Chicago v. Tribune Co., supra n. 93, p. 90.
95 O'Hara v. Stack, 90 Pa. 477 (1879); Nunnery v. Bailey, 65 Okla. 260, 166
P. 82, 83 (1917).
96 Morasse v. Brocher, 151 Mass. 567, 25 N. E. 74, 78 (1890).
97 Fitzgerald v. Robinson, 112 Mass. 371 (1873).
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and do induce action or inaction on the part of the hearer.98 No
clergyman seems to have been involved in litigation on this point,
but in many other cases, where the parties stood in a relation of
trust and confidence, it was held that reliance upon expert
opinion was justifiable. 99
b. Interference with family relation. Since clergymen are vi-
tally interested in furthering religious family life, ministers of all
faiths devote considerable time and effort to counsel with mem-
bers of families. Yet, the interest of undisturbed relations among
members of the family is recognized by public policy also, and
the tendency is to allow recovery for its disturbance. The gist of
the tort is an interference with a mental attitude of the family
members, especially towards husband or parents. The tort must
be an intentional one, directed at the relation itself. 100
Church and state are tacitly in accord with respect to inter-
ference with family relations. There are cases, however, such as
those in families of mixed religious backgrounds, where a min-
ister may be accused of tortious interference. The most im-
portant defense is that of privilege. The interest of parents in
advising their children, even after marriage, is recognized by a
privilege where it is done to advance the child's welfare. When
the purpose of the defendant is something else than the benefit
of the recipient of the advice, the privilege is forfeited. A stranger
has no general privilege of interference, but there may be re-
lations of professional character which justify acts tending to
disrupt the marriage or the family relation.1° 1
c. Interference with contract to marry. The courts are gen-
erally reluctant to hold that it is an actionable tort to induce the
parties to break a contract to marry. Society does not favor hasty
and ill-conceived marriages.10 2 Honest advice given by friends,
relatives, or by a spiritual advisor is privileged. No law suit is
known to text writers where a higher court made a ruling against
a minister for his advice to breach a contract to marry. 0 3
d. Interference with other contractual relations and with pro-
spective advantage. The law protects a person in his interference
in this field if his impersonal and disinterested motive was of a
laudable character. 10 4 The minister, like other persons who
strive to protect the public interest, may receive protection in
98 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 57, p. 561.
99 Rice v. Press, 117 Vt. 442, 94 A. 2d 397 (1953); Spiess v. Brandt, 230 Minn.
246, 41 N. W. 2d 561 (1950).
100 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 57.
101 Modisett v. McPike, 74 Mo. 636 (1881); Jennings v. Cooper, 230 S. W.
325 (Mo. App., 1921); Restatement of Torts, § 686, Comment d.
102 Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 Harv. L. R. 728,
751 (1928); Lukas v. Tarpilauskas, 266 Mass. 498, 165 N. E. 513 (1929);
Minsky v. Satenstein, 6 N. J. Misc. 978, 143 A. 512 (1928).
103 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 57, p. 727.
104 Kruyer Publ. Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N. W. 948 (1916); Ann.
Cas. 778 (1918 C).
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his interference with contractual relations and especially with
prospective advantages. 10 5
The proselytizing activities of ministers may not be con-
sidered as such an interference with advantageous relations of
other churches as to justify civil courts' taking of jurisdiction.
The constitutional freedom of religion would prevent any church
body from bringing action against other churches or their min-
isters for inducing people to change religion or church. The
proselytizing activities of the minister, however, may not be car-
ried out with actually tortious intent with inpunity.
If a schism is effected by ministers within the denomination,
the law is not concerned with the split of the church but only
with property or civil rights. 10 6
VI. Probable Future Developments
The fast-growth of American churches, the economic
strength of the denominations, the development of tort law, and
especially the stands of the clergy in many hotly debated public
issues-such as the questions of segregation, peace, gambling,
and others-soon may raise many as yet unprecedented ques-
tions which may bring cases of first impression into the court-
room.
The attitudes of the American Protestant and other churches
towards church unions may throw into the lap of the courts
renewed demands to help the church unions by changing the
court-made law with respect to property rights.
It is to be expected, therefore, that church-related questions
will be more and more diversified in the courts for some time to
come.
105 Brimelow v. Casson, 1 Ch. 302 (1924).
106 Kedroff v. St. Nicholaus Cathedral, supra n. 85; Watson v. Jones, supra
n. 85; Romanian Orthodox Missionary Episcopate v. Trutza, 120 F. Supp. 183
(N. D. Ohio 1952).
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